SpaceX's New Solution to Fix Starship Problem after Flight 9 Uncontrolled Crash

Success comes from what we learn—and SpaceX lives by this philosophy after every flight. It’s exactly why they lead the industry. Flight 9 just wrapped up, revealing fresh challenges and opportunities. But what fixes will SpaceX deploy to turn these lessons into future victories?

I trust you enjoyed the spectacle of Flight 9 on May 29th. Its successes gave us cause for celebration, even as its near misses reminded us of the work still ahead. With Flight 9 behind us and Elon Musk vowing a launch cadence for the next three flights—roughly one every 3–4 weeks—all eyes turn to Flight 10.

To prepare for that rapid rhythm, SpaceX must tackle the lingering issues revealed on Flight 9, ensuring each step forward stands on solid engineering foundations. Let’s dive deep into the issues, solutions, and roadmap for Flight 10.

The Dramatic End of Superheavy B14

Superheavy B14’s dramatic end came during its landing burn, when an in-air explosion cut short its ocean touchdown mere moments before success.

The culprit? Flight data and post-mission analysis point squarely to the aggressive high-angle-of-attack descent profile that was being tested. This approach intended to conserve fuel—but it generated intense lateral loads on the booster’s skin.

Those forces appear to have exceeded structural limits, allowing a fracture or separation in the vehicle’s primary structure—followed by rapid burn-through and detonation of residual propellant.

Balancing Performance with Safety

Faced with this outcome, SpaceX leadership must decide how to balance performance gains with hardware longevity and safety. One path is to dial back the steep descent maneuvers in the near term and return to the proven catch approach using the tower’s mechanical arms.

That method proved reliable in Flight 7, yielding an intact booster ready for rapid refurbishment. By resuming tower captures for Flight 10, SpaceX safeguards ground infrastructure and keeps the turnaround schedule on track—albeit without immediate fuel savings from steep descents.

Alternatively, SpaceX could continue refining high-angle profiles but do so over water to protect pad assets. Conducting ocean landings for these tests would enable incremental increases in descent aggressiveness while containing risk.

In that scenario, SpaceX might assign Flight 10’s steep-angle test to a reused booster—most logically B15, which flew once—or even a fresh booster to preserve flight-proven hardware. Each ocean trial would help engineers optimize descent guidance, control algorithms, and structural reinforcements until the booster can reliably survive more demanding approaches.

Weighing the Options

Both options offer merits. Returning to tower catches ensures continuity and speed, while water-based steep descent tests advance fuel efficiency research. The decision will hinge on SpaceX’s tolerance for risk, the status of ground refurbishment workflows, and pad availability under a tightening launch cadence.

Whatever the choice, a clear plan must emerge weeks before Flight 10, so teams can modify flight software, update procedural checklists, and schedule any required hardware upgrades.

The Engine Ignition System Challenge

Beyond the descent profile itself, Flight 9 exposed weaknesses in the engine ignition system. One Raptor engine failed to relight during the landing burn just before the explosion.

Reigniting Raptor engines under cold fuel conditions after multiple engine cycles in flight is one of Starship’s most complex technical challenges. Temperature extremes in the igniter lines, repeated thermal cycling, and mechanical stresses from engine gimballing can degrade igniter performance.

Building on Flight 8 Enhancements

To remedy this, SpaceX must build on the insulation and flow path enhancements introduced after Flight 8. They should add thicker thermal barriers around igniter assemblies and reroute plumbing away from hotspots.

A redundant ignition igniter—perhaps a small auxiliary spark plug system that can activate if the primary mechanism fails—would provide a vital backup. In the weeks before Flight 10, ground test teams should subject identical Raptors to dozens of rapid-fire ignition cycles, replicating the exact temperature, vibration, and pressure conditions of a full mission profile.

Automated test stands that cycle cold fuel through a stationary Raptor—while capturing every millisecond of pressure, temperature, and spark plug behavior—will highlight the circumstances under which reliability degrades.

Armed with that data, SpaceX can refine igniter recipes, select more heat-resistant materials, and rewrite flight hardware to adapt ignition commands if sensors detect impending failures.

Preparing for Raptor 3

In the longer term, the arrival of Raptor 3—a simplified, refractory-metal-rich design—may prove the ultimate fix. But in the immediate term, zeroing in on the current igniter will be paramount.

A further booster challenge is proving fault tolerance in landing scenarios. SpaceX intends to test a two-engine final burn, cutting one of the three inner-ring engines to prove the booster can land safely even with an engine out.

That maneuver demands scrupulous reliability. Only by eliminating ignition uncertainty can the team risk shutting down one engine mid-descent. For Flight 10, SpaceX may choose water landings to refine the two-engine burn first—then graduate to a tower catch once confidence levels are high.

Each of these trials will push the booster closer to the day when a successful catch for a fully reused booster becomes routine.

Ship 35’s Challenges and Fires

While Superheavy’s fixes draw on data booster tests, Ship 35’s challenges are more intricate. On Flight 9, observers noted small fires on the vacuum engine fairing and the lower skirt areas already flagged during Flight 8.

Possible sources include exhaust impingement from Raptor plumes, micro leaks in pressurization or hydraulic lines, or ignition of aerodynamic heater elements. Though these flare-ups didn’t immediately compromise flight safety, they highlight Starship’s vulnerability to stray flames and the need for improved thermal protection.

Improving Fire Protection

In the run-up to Flight 10, the team should install additional ablative or insulated cladding around the skirt-to-engine junctions and consider channeling flame-resistant coatings across the outer skin.

More ambitiously, embedded fire detection sensors linked to localized carbon dioxide or water mist suppression nozzles could snuff out any spot fires before they spread. The mass penalty will be minimal compared to the benefit of near-zero fire risk during rapid reuse cycles.

The SECO Catastrophe and Uncontrolled Spin

Flight 9’s most catastrophic failure for Ship 35 came after SECO (Second Engine Cut-Off), during the unpowered coast toward re-entry.

The vehicle’s loss of orientation, followed by an uncontrolled spin, turned re-entry into its harshest test yet. Instead of presenting its windward heat shield, Ship 35 tumbled, exposing every flank—especially the shield’s latches, aft flaps, and structural joints—to searing plasma.

When communications briefly returned, cameras revealed an aft flap that had partially burned away—a stark testament to the damage inflicted. The violent spin induced massive vibrations that threatened plumbing, avionics racks, and weld seams alike.

Solving the Tank Pressure Loss

Diagnosing this, Elon Musk pointed to a loss of main tank pressure. A propellant leak had bled away ullage gas or cryogenic fuel, dropping tank pressure below the level required to feed engines and control thrusters. Without those thrusters, the ship could not maintain orientation, and the tumble began.

Leaks in Starship’s stainless steel tanks are notoriously tricky. Welds must handle wide thermal swings—from cryogenic chill to re-entry heat—and a single pinhole can trigger a catastrophic spiral.

Enhancing Tank Fabrication Protocols

To close this vulnerability, SpaceX will need to enhance tank fabrication protocols. This might involve double-seaming all major welds, coating external surfaces with a welded-on metallic film to seal micro fractures, or installing a secondary internal bladder designed to activate if the primary tank fails.

In parallel, a high-fidelity leak detection network—combining pressure transducers, ultrasonic leak sensors, and Hall-effect flow meters—must report the smallest pressure loss instantly.

Onboard autopilot logic can then trigger an emergency safing sequence: reorient the ship, throttle back engines, or use attitude control thrusters to maintain heat-shield-forward orientation until a planned splashdown.

Re-Entry Dynamics and Control Authority

Beyond tank integrity, Ship 35’s re-entry dynamics demand improved control authority. Flight 9 highlighted that Starship’s flaps—its only aerodynamic surfaces for hypersonic guidance—can’t counter uncontrolled spin once thrusters vanish.

Ship 35’s failure to deploy its payload bay doors during Flight 9 adds another layer of complexity. Whether the root cause was a frozen actuator, a misaligned hinge, or a flimsy latch—payload deployment must be rock solid for Starship to fulfill its promise as a multi-utility vehicle.

Redesigning for Simplicity and Redundancy

A redesign should aim for simplicity: fewer moving parts, redundant actuators, and failsafe latches that can be triggered by alternate commands or even manual pyrotechnic relief.

Ground rigs should cycle these doors hundreds or thousands of times in a thermal vacuum environment, simulating the exact conditions they’ll face in orbit.

Integrated Testing and Ground Operations

Beyond hardware fixes, the overarching theme for Flight 10 preparation is integrated testing. SpaceX must mesh data from booster and ship flight telemetry with ground-based replicas running holistic simulations of the entire mission—from ignition through splashdown—so that no system lives in isolation.

Flight software updates must incorporate new failure detection heuristics, enabling onboard computers to adapt in real time to developing anomalies—whether a tank leak, an engine misfire, or an errant plasma strike.

Streamlining Post-Flight Inspection

Finally, all these painstaking technical improvements must be matched by robust ground operations. A launch pace of one flight every 3–4 weeks leaves little room for protracted investigations.

Post-flight inspection routines must be streamlined using automated non-destructive evaluation tools: ultrasound scanners, thermographic cameras, and laser profilometers to certify structural readiness within days.

Component swaps should happen via plug-and-play modules rather than labor-intensive rebuilds. And the data from each flight must feed directly into AI-driven anomaly detection systems that spot trends invisible to human eyes.

Conclusion

If SpaceX can nail these fixes—reinforcing tanks, perfecting igniters, optimizing flaps, safeguarding against fires, ensuring payload deployment, and refining ground workflows—then Flight 10 will stand not only as another star on Starship’s record but as the moment when iterative learning propels the program into an era of true rapid reusability.

So what do you think? Which improvements matter most, and in what order should SpaceX tackle them? Let us know in the comments section below.

FAQs

Q1. What was the main cause of the Flight 9 uncontrolled crash?
The main cause was a loss of main tank pressure leading to an uncontrolled spin after SECO (Second Engine Cut-Off). This spin exposed structural weaknesses and caused significant damage during re-entry.

Q2. Why did the Superheavy booster explode during the landing burn?
The Superheavy B14 booster attempted a high-angle descent maneuver that generated excessive lateral loads on its structure, leading to a structural failure and subsequent explosion.

Q3. What is SpaceX doing to prevent future uncontrolled spins during re-entry?
SpaceX plans to improve tank fabrication protocols, add leak detection sensors, and upgrade attitude control thrusters to maintain orientation even during emergencies.

Q4. How does SpaceX plan to improve the Raptor engine’s ignition system?
SpaceX is refining igniter insulation, rerouting fuel lines, and testing rapid-fire ignition cycles to ensure reliable restarts during landing burns.

Q5. Will SpaceX continue using high-angle descent profiles for Superheavy?
They may test these profiles over water landings to reduce risk while refining control systems and booster structures before returning to tower catches.

Q6. What is Raptor 3, and how might it help?
Raptor 3 is a simplified, more robust version of the current Raptor engine. It’s designed to handle heat and stress better, potentially reducing ignition issues.

Q7. What is SpaceX doing to prevent fires on Ship 35?
SpaceX plans to add better thermal protection, fire suppression systems, and flame-resistant coatings to reduce the risk of fires during flight.

Q8. How is SpaceX addressing the potential for tank leaks?
They’re considering double-seaming welds, adding internal bladders, and improving leak detection with high-fidelity sensors.

Q9. What’s the plan for booster landing tests on Flight 10?
SpaceX might use a water landing to refine two-engine final burns and steep descents before resuming tower catches.

Q10. How will payload deployment reliability be improved?
By redesigning door mechanisms with redundant actuators, simpler latches, and thorough ground testing under thermal vacuum conditions.

Q11. What’s being done to improve post-flight inspections?
SpaceX plans to use automated, non-destructive evaluation tools like ultrasound, thermography, and laser scanning to speed up turnaround.

Q12. How will Flight 10 benefit from integrated testing?
All flight systems—booster, ship, engines—will be tested together, reducing the risk of isolated failures and ensuring smoother missions.

Q13. What role does software play in these fixes?
Flight software will integrate new failure detection algorithms to handle anomalies like leaks, engine failures, and orientation issues in real-time.

Q14. When can we expect Flight 10 to launch?
Elon Musk suggests a new Starship launch every 3–4 weeks, so Flight 10 could launch as early as mid to late June, depending on fixes and readiness.

SpaceX’s New Solution to Fix Starship Problem after Flight 9 Uncontrolled Crash